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MEMOIRS OF A GENERAL IN THE 
INGLORIOUS REVOLUTION 
Lawrence G. Sager* 
ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION: A FIRST-
HAND ACCOUNT. By Charles Fried. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
1991. Pp. 256. $19.95. 
I 
Conservative constitutional theory has been marked by an unwill-
ingness to confront questions of political morality head on. Conserva-
tives have too often proffered an implausible, denatured view of 
constitutional adjudication that sees judges as glorified meter readers 
whose job is to report what they have found in the basement of his-
tory. Committed to a thin account of democracy that bows unreflec-
tively to majoritarian political processes, these theorists have insisted 
that judges have only the license to recover the decisions made by his-
torical constitutional majorities and encrypted in the text of the 
Constitution. 
This view, sometimes called originalism, fails to capture the actual 
practice of constitutional decisionmaking as it is today, as it has ever 
been, or indeed, as it could be: the text and historical context of the 
Constitution cannot yield answers to questions of meaning without en-
gaging judgments of political value on the part of those who undertake 
its interpretation. 
Without bending originalism well past its breaking point, con-
servative constitutional critics cannot explain even the core of our con-
stitutional tradition. They cannot explain, for example, the institution 
of judicial review itself, or the application of the Bill of Rights - orig-
inally directed at federal conduct exclusively ~ to the states, or the 
central details of our commitment to free speech. Persuasive discourse 
about any of these involves locating the matter at issue within an at-
tractive account of the Constitution and our constitutional tradition; 
and judgments of political value are the stuff of which such an account 
must be built. Even more clearly, conservative commentators can take 
no support from the originalist protocol they sponsor for their own 
constitutional projects, like resisting affirmative action. 
Some constitutional conservatives, faced with these looming diffi-
culties, have led uneasy theoretical double lives. Quietly, these theo-
• Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1963, Pomona College; LL.B. 1966, Co-
lumbia. - Ed. 
1203 
1204 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:1203 
rists have commuted to more plausible understandings of 
constitutional adjudication in order to explain the elementary premises 
of our constitutional tradition and to advance their political agenda. 
At the same time, they continue to pay lip service to the narrow prem-
ises of naive originalism in order to support their charge that judges 
and commentators who have adopted more liberal views of the Consti-
tution are not merely wrong but subversive - guilty of bending judi-
cial authority undemocratically to their own political ends. Lost in 
this theoretical handwaving is the opportunity for serious discussion of 
the important constitutional disputes. 1 
It is a welcome change, accordingly, to open Charles Fried's apolo-
gia for his term of office as Solicitor General of the United States and 
encounter a far more realistic and attractive view of constitutional ad-
judication. Fried acknowledges that the objections to originalism are 
"devastating" (p. 62), and emphasizes that the Constitution must be 
subject to the same rich canons of interpretation as other legal sources 
(p. 64). 
He takes as the model of good judging Justice Harlan's opinion in 
Poe v. Ullman 2 defending the right of married couples to resist Con-
necticut's ban on the use of contraceptives. Justice Black, who criti-
cized Harlan's approach in Poe as ethical adventurism, is dismissed by 
Fried as pursuing "[an] anti-intellectual, textual fundamentalism," 
while Harlan is celebrated for his "belief in the possibility - indeed, 
inevitability - of reasoning and judgment in applying the Constitu-
tion" (p. 73). Sounding more like a disciple of Ronald Dworkin than a 
general in the Reagan revolution, Fried describes what he sees as the 
ground that he and Harlan share: 
In interpreting the broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Constitution as a whole should serve as a guide. The particular guaran-
tees specified in the Bill of Rights are like the points on a graph, which 
the judge joins by a line to describe a coherent and rationally compelling 
function. [p. 74] 
Asking for nothing more than "a conception of law disciplined by 
a respect for tradition, professionalism, and careful, candid reasoning" 
(p. 70), Fried emphatically rejects originalism's infatuation with ma-
jority rule: 
I am puzzled by the originalist celebration of majority rule as the pre-
sumed default source of law, from which one may only depart on the 
clearest textual warrant in the Constitution, a warrant underwritten by 
the intent of the framers. The originalists belong to the party of liberty 
- as do I - so it is odd to see them repair to majority rule, which has 
not often been seen as a very secure haven of liberty, and certainly was 
1. I defend and elaborate on these complaints in the course of a critique of the views of 
Robert Bork, who is regarded by many as the founding spokesperson of originalism. See Law-
rence Sager, Back to Bork, N.Y. REV. BKS., Oct. 25, 1990, at 23. 
2. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), discussed at pp. 72-75. 
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not seen as such by the framers. The framing generation would soon 
have the French Revolution to show that majority rule, pure and direct, 
was a will-o'-the-wisp, the pursuit of which could only end in calamity 
for justice, for tranquility, for prosperity, for liberty - the things they 
really cared about. The sense in which the Constitution is based on the 
consent of the governed is complex and structured. The authority, pow-
ers, and methods of John Marshall's judiciary were - and are - en-
tirely appropriate to it. [pp. 67-68] 
But hold the amens. As generous to modem understandings of 
constitutional adjudication as all this may seem, Fried also insists from 
the outset on his status as a bona fide revolutionary, leading the right-
eous battle on the field of legal theory. "In a real sense the Solicitor 
General is responsible for the government's legal theories, its legal phi-
losophy. And legal philosophy was at the heart of the Reagan Revolu-
tion" (pp. 14-15). And there is nothing namby-pamby about his 
rhetorical swipes at the constitutional judiciary. His early salvos in-
clude characterizations of the pre-Reagan Supreme Court as "com-
plicit in the aggrandizement of government [and] ... a principal 
engine for redistributing wealth and shackling the energies and enter-
prise of the productive sector" (p. 17), as guilty of "a mistaken ap-
proach to judging . . . that confused and threatened the ideal of the 
rule of law" (p. 20), and as embracing, all in all, "a system of judging 
that had run badly off the rails" (p. 57). 
Two of Fried's three revolutionary targets are abortion and affirm-
ative action. 3 Taken together, they represent the deepest source of 
Fried's complaints about the pre-Reagan world of public law: Roe v. 
Wade 4 is cast as the worst symptom of a judiciary that has lost its 
bearings and perverted its role (pp. 20, 57, 75-88); while the pre-Rea-
gan treatment of affirmative action inspires the charge that liberty has 
been sacrificed to a judicially inspired scheme of egalitarian social en-
gineering (pp. 20, 89-90, 93-101, 118-22). 
We already have enough of Fried's battle plan in front of us to 
appreciate the difficult campaign of justification he faces in his book. 
On two levels, his positions threaten to contradict themselves. He has 
forsaken naive originalism in favor of a sophisticated and robust un- · 
derstanding of constitutional adjudication, but he still undertakes to 
establish Roe v. Wade as the glaring symptom of a fundamentally mis-
guided approach to judging. At the same time Fried levels this deep 
criticism of Roe and the pre-Reagan Court, he means to show that the 
other critical failing in public law is that government, by endorsing 
affirmative action, has usurped prerogatives that belong in the domain 
of private choice. 
3. The third is separation of powers in general and the Independent Counsel controversy in 
particular. This issue does not engage Fried's harsh criticism of the judiciary. 
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Were he able at once to erp.brace a defensible model of constitu-
tional adjudication and yet defend his fierce indictment of pre-Reagan 
Supreme Court methodology, and were he able to justify his apparent 
unconcern for the liberty of women to secure abortions while passion-
ately advancing the cause of economic liberty, Fried would have ac-
complished something of considerable interest and importance. He 
would have offered a serious, coherent defense of the modern con-
servative agenda, and thereby have enriched political discourse. 
Unfortunately, Fried's memoir - breezy and literate as it is -
falls badly short of this ambition. 
II 
The abortion controversy lies at the center of Fried's problems; it 
is the source of tension for both his methodological and substantive 
claims. At the behest of the Reagan administration, Fried twice asked 
the Supreme Court to overrule Roe.5 He urged the Court then, and 
urges his readers now, to see Roe as the wrongheaded decision of a 
Court out of touch with its proper role in constitutional governance. 
But he accepts Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 which invalidated a law 
preventing married couples from buying or using contraceptives, as 
well within the paradigm of good judging (pp. 85-86). 
At the heart of Fried's attempt to establish an analytical chasm 
between Griswold and Roe is a familiar argument: the Constitution is 
"silent" on the question of the legal and moral status of the fetus, 
neither insisting that the state protect fetal life as it would the life of a 
person nor forbidding it from so doing; accordingly, protection of the 
fetus takes place in an aconstitutional space where majority rule 
should prevail. Where state legislatures have voted to usurp a wo-
man's choice whether to bear the fetus she carries to term or to have it 
aborted, they are entitled to the authority of their majoritarian status 
as exercised over the question of fetal protection (pp. 77-78). 
Obviously, this tidy equation is missing a crucial term: the unwill-
ing pregnant woman, forced by the state to bear the fetus for nine 
• months, to endure the physical and emotional consequences of both 
pregnancy and delivery, and to face the impossible, inhuman choice 
between unwelcome parenthood and abandonment of an infant child. 
How exactly are we to understand the observation that the Constitu-
tion is silent on the legal or moral status of the fetus, in this context, 
where silence is invoked in response to the claim of the unwilling preg-
nant woman that she is being treated unjustly when the state requires 
her to carry the fetus to term? 
5. Webster v. Reproductive HClllth Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), discussed at pp. 85-88; 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), dis· 
cussed at pp. 33-35. 
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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Fried appears to be saying that, absent explicit material in the text 
or context of the Constitution foreclosing the state from protecting 
fetal life as it would human life, majoritarian process must prevail, 
whatever the nature of the burden thereby imposed on women. So 
understood, Fried adopts precisely the originalist position that he took 
such pains to renounce earlier, the position that treats majority rule as 
the presumptive state of our governance, yielding only to unmistaka-
ble commands of the Constitution. In so doing, Fried ignores impor-
tant analytical possibilities excluded only by an originalist dogma that 
he himself discredits. 
He ignores, for example, the view - suggested by the much 
maligned opinion of the Court in Roe - that the constitutionally 
founded interests of women who suffer unwanted pregnancies should 
prevail over an interest of the state in protecting the fetus, given the 
absence of constitutional support for the state's characterization of the 
fetus as human life and the absence of any nonconstitutional legal tra-
dition, or any social consensus, regarding the fetus as a person.7 
Refuge in originalism's obeisance to majority rule is so baldly con-
tradictory of Fried's purported beliefs about the Constitution as to en-
courage a more charitable reading. In this spirit, we might understand 
Fried's reference to the silence of the Constitution not as an argument 
in itself, but as a way of stating the conclusion to an analysis of the 
Constitution and our constitutional tradition - an analysis that takes 
account both of the great and disproportionate burden of unwanted 
pregnancies on women trying to chart lives for themselves, and of 
Griswold v. Connecticut, yet still finds fault with Roe v. Wade. 
To the extent that Fried has any such argument to offer, it is cap-
tured in his oral argument before the Supreme Court in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services. Appearing on behalf of the United 
States, amicus curiae, Fried for the second time asked the Court to 
overrule Roe. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy pressed Fried to ex-
plain how the liberty interest the Court recognized in Griswold could 
suddenly collapse when abortion was at issue; Fried is sufficiently 
pleased with his response to reprint it at length: 
Justice O'Connor: Do you say there is no fundamental right to de-
cide whether or not? ... to procreate? 
A: I would hesitate to formulate the right in such abstract terms, and I 
think the Court prior to Roe versus Wade quite prudently also avoided 
such sweeping generalities. That was the wisdom of Griswold. 
Justice O'Connor: Do you think that the state has the right to, if in a 
future century we had a serious overpopulation problem, has a right to 
require women to have abortions after so many children? 
A: I surely do not. That would be quite a different matter. 
Justice O'Connor: What do you rest that on? 
7. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-62. 
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A: Because unlike abortion, which involves the purposeful termination 
of future life, that would involve not preventing an operation, but vio-
lently ... laying hands on a woman and submitting her to an operation 
Justice O'Connor: And you would rest that on substantive due-pro-
cess protection? 
A: Absolutely. 
Justice Kennedy: How do you define the liberty interest of the wo-
man in that connection? 
A: The liberty interest against a seizure would be concerned. That is 
how the Court analyzed the matter in Griswold. That is how Justice 
Harlan analyzed the matter in Poe v. Ullman which is, in some sense, the 
root of this area of law .... 
Justice Kennedy: How would you define the ... liberty interest ... 
of a woman in an abortion case? 
A: I would define it in terms of the concrete impositions on the woman 
which so offended the Court in Griswold and which are not present in the 
Roe situation. [pp. 85-86; footnote omitted] 
Remarkably, what Fried sees as distinguishing Roe from the natu-
ral reach of the liberty interest recognized in Griswold is the absence in 
Roe of the "concrete impositions" suffered by married couples in Gris-
wold. Similarly, what he sees as distinguishing Roe from Justice 
O'Connor's compulsory abortion hypothetical is that compulsory 
abortion would entail the state "laying hands on a woman and submit-
ting her to an operation." It is hard to imagine what Professor Fried 
could have in mind here. The idea that requiring a woman to endure a 
pregnancy followed by the medical procedure of childbirth - a proce-
dure that may require serious surgery - is less a "concrete imposi-
tion" on her, less a "laying hands on" her, than requiring her to 
submit to an abortion, is simply wrong, at least in an age where the 
stork and cabbage leaf are unavailable as mechanisms of delivery. 
Even more demanding of his readers' credulity is Fried's assertion 
that Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives by married couples 
in Griswold constituted a more opprobrious imposition on women than 
did Texas' restrictions on abortion in Roe. Fried at moments suggests 
that Griswold should be particularized to the state's prying into mari-
tal intimacy (pp. 76-77), but he quickly concedes that the principles of 
Griswold extend to Justice O'Connor's mandatory abortion hypotheti-
cal and to state attempts to outlaw homosexual conduct as well (pp. 
82-84). 
Fried simply has no basis consistent with his own premises for de-
nying the reach of the liberty interest recognized in Griswold to a wo-
man who suffers an unwanted pregnancy. To make sense of his 
position, he can only repair to the offsetting concern of a state that 
takes itself to be protecting the life of a person when it protects the life 
of a fetus. But that could only be the beginning of his argument, not 
the end. He would still have to explain how the Supreme Court could 
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sensibly recognize that a woman suffering an unwanted pregnancy had 
a Griswold-based liberty interest in abortion and yet concede to state 
governments the capacity to define for themselves in the selective con-
text of abortion the weight of the competing interest in the protection 
of the fetus. s 
So far we have taken at face value Fried's commitment to the prop-
osition that he regards as central to an understanding of the Supreme 
Court's failure in Roe v. Wade: state legislatures have the constitu-
tional license to equate fetal life with the life of the person, and abor-
tion with the taking of an innocent person's life. Our observations 
have all spoken to the difficulty Fried has in justifying that position. If 
he is serious about leaving the untenable protocol of originalism be-
hind, his claim from the silence of the Constitution has to be dismissed 
as a lapse of reason. If he means the reference to silence metaphori-
cally, as a way of stating the conclusion to a process of reflection on 
the relevant constitutional materials, then he collides with Griswold v. 
Connecticut, which he himself lauds. But Fried's problems with abor-
tion go still further. Not only is he unable to defend the idea that state 
legislatures have license to define abortion as murder; he is also unable 
to live with the natural consequences of that idea. 
Having castigated the Supreme Court at length for its "infuriat-
ing" decision in Roe (p. 81 ), and having presented the curing of the 
egregious judicial abuses exemplified by Roe as the issue most dear to 
the Reagan revolutionaries whose banner he carried, Fried ends his 
discussion of abortion with a remarkable set of qualifications to his 
own theme: 
[H]aving one day abandoned Roe, the Court may reasonably distin-
guish between statutes forbidding abortions outright and statutes requir-
ing a delay of a few days in which a woman may consider alternatives to 
abortion, which the clinic is obliged to tell her about; or between statutes 
regulating abortion services and statutes punishing women who undergo 
abortions. This last is a distinction that might have considerable practi-
cal importance with the greater availability of safe, simple, self-adminis-
tered pharmaceuticals to induce early-term abortions. In fact, medical 
8. Fried might resist this analytical structure, and argue that the Griswold liberty interest is 
similar in form to the liberty famously argued for by John Stuart Mill. For Mill, it was the 
absence of a certain sort of collective interest, the avoidance of harm to other persons, that made 
some collective restraints on behavior improper. In Mill's own words, "the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others." JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON 
LIBERTY, AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (H.B. Acton ed., 
J.M. Dent & Sons 1972) (1859). Fried might understand Griswold in this way, and see the state's 
interest in protecting fetal life as the life of a person as voiding a claim from Griswold rather than 
offsetting it. But this view of things gives Fried no help. If anything, it puts more pressure still 
on the idea that a state legislature can justify its restraints on abortion by deeming the extinction 
of fetal life to be the equivalent of murder; on that account, a state, rather than the Supreme 
Court, decides whether Griswold applies. Moreover, this view of Griswold is at odds with Fried's 
response to Justice O'Connor, which concedes that Griswold would apply to mandated abortion 
even if it were imposed in the interest of preventing the harms of overpopulation. 
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discoveries might then make this whole constitutional episode moot. [p. 
87] 
Suddenly, nothing in Fried's position seems to hold. Women 
surely should be constitutionally entitled to obtain and use medicines 
or other safe devices to induce early-term abortions;9 and statutes that 
broadly forbid abortions surely should not survive Supreme Court 
scrutiny. Fried makes his position seem more reasonable by acknowl-
edging as much here. But neither of these propositions is consistent 
with his attack on Roe, which depends on the claim that state legisla-
tures are entitled to treat fetuses as persons and abortion as the taking 
of an innocent person's life.10 Were state legislatures able to declare 
the fetus a person, they would in turn be able to protect the fetus 
against abortifacients; had Fried persuaded the Supreme Court to 
adopt his view of state legislative authority, his qualifications would 
have been thereby undone. 
Ill 
When Fried turns to his second target, affirmative action, he leaves 
behind any thought that an absence of a clear constitutional mandate 
invites deference to legislative judgement. Fried concedes that ours is 
a "society that had practiced public and private apartheid" (p. 99), 
inflicting "centuries of deprivation" (p. 100) on black Americans. But 
he sees affirmative action - including Title VII doctrine, which in his 
view induces employers to adopt racial preferences - as angering 
whites, demoralizing blacks, and fostering "a bureaucratic-collectivist 
state" (p. 105). His passion, oddly suppressed when the matter at is-
sue is the plight of women who suffer unwanted pregnancies, is fully 
engaged here: within seven pages he is moved on three occasions to 
characterize the "left-collectivism" (p. 101) of affirmative action as 
"sinister" (pp. 99, 100, 105). 
The efficacy and wisdom of affirmative action programs is a matter 
on which well-meaning persons can disagree; we ought to welcome 
debate, even passionate and hyperbolic debate, when the stakes are so 
high and the issues so complex. But Fried means to argue that affirm-
ative action programs are very often unconstitutional, not merely un-
wise. Even the most robust view of constitutional interpretation 
9. The most prominent pharmaceutical option now available in Europe, but not the United 
States, is RU 486. RU 486, properly considered, does not induce abortions at all, or operate to 
the detriment of a fetus, since it acts to prevent implantation of the fertilized egg by suppressing 
the hormone progesterone. See generally Jane M. Cohen, Comparison-Shopping in the Market-
place of Rights, 98 YALE L.J. 1235, 1254-56 (1989). 
Ethical controversy over the status of the fetus could be enlarged, of course, to include the 
fertilized egg prior to implantation; this can only place still greater strain on the idea that state 
legislatures are free to bless a prenatal entity with personhood. 
10. For a similar critique of the contradictory nature of Fried's moderating premises, see 
Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the Supreme Court, N.Y. REV. BKS., July 18, 
1991, at 23. 
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insists on something more than the invocation of the specter of "left-
collectivism" to explain why governmental entities should be barred 
from the effort to redress the disgraceful consequences of slavery and 
discrimination. 
Fried finds the basis of his constitutional attack in a principle that 
he proffers early on but never defends at length: "the basic right of 
every person to be considered as a distinct individual and not in terms 
of the groups to which the government says he belongs" (p. 90). Ac-
cordingly, government should never adopt a program that prefers or 
disprefers persons or enterprises on the ground of race. Even remedies 
for past wrongs are unconstitutional on this view, unless they return 
the individuals benefited or harmed by unlawful discrimination to the 
positions they would have occupied absent that discrimination. 
Describing the Reagan administration's endorsement of this view 
as the basis of its campaign against affirmative action, Fried celebrates 
it as the policy of "color-blindness" and invokes the famous dissent of 
the first Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson: "[I]n view of the Consti-
tution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, domi-
nant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution 
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens." 11 Fried is careful - though his readers could easily miss the 
implicit disclaimer - to appropriate Harlan's color-blind Constitution 
only as a "good slogan" (p. 101). He could not plausibly depend on 
Harlan for more: it surely does not follow from the unconstitutional-
ity of a legally enforced caste system that race-conscious efforts to ef-
face the residue of caste are unconstitutional. 
It was precisely the effacement of the residue of caste, of course, 
that was at hazard when the Reagan administration advanced its ver-
sion of the color-blind Constitution. In the name of "color-blindness," 
for example, Fried appeared for the United States in City of Richmond 
v. Croson 12 to argue successfully that it was unconstitutional for Rich-
mond to set aside thirty percent of its construction contracts for mi-
nority-owned businesses. And in the name of that precept, Fried set 
out to "tame" (p. 121) the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co. 13 
Griggs held that a facially neutral, benignly motivated employment 
practice that disproportionately excludes minorities from the 
workforce violates Title VII unless it is justified by a "business neces-
sity." Fried's complaint about Griggs and cases that have followed its 
lead is indirect: he worries that employers whose work forces have a 
slender complement of persons of color will be moved by fears of Title 
VII liability voluntarily to create employment preferences aimed at 
11. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1?96) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted at p. 101. 
12. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
13. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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bolstering their numbers (pp. 94-95). Fried looked for an opportunity 
to chip away at the Griggs line of cases and found it in the 1989 case 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 14 
Wards Cove vividly illustrates how poorly suited limited antidis-
crimination principles are to the task of undoing the entrenched conse-
quences of racism. Characteristic of the industry of which they are a 
part - seasonal salmon canning in Alaska - the two enterprises chal-
lenged under Title VII in Wards Cove were vividly stratified along ra-
cial lines. The canneries staffed their assembly lines almost exclusively 
with Filipinos and Alaska Natives. The other jobs - better paid work 
ranging from dock labor and construction to carpentry, cooking, 
storekeeping, and bookkeeping - were predominately held by whites. 
The cannery line workers were housed in separate dormitories and fed 
in separate mess halls, facilities which, at least in the eyes of the four 
dissenting justices, were distinctly inferior.15 The cannery line work-
ers were hired through a union local or from nearby Native Alaskan 
villages. The noncannery jobs were not advertised or filled in any sys-
tematic or competitive way. There was no in-house training and no 
promotion from the cannery line to the noncannery jobs. The salmon 
gutting machine, unhappily, was known as the "iron chink" (p. 122). 
In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, Jus-
tice Stevens was moved to characterize the employment regime as a 
"plantation economy."16 
Fried sees it as "obvious that the Philippine workers were not the 
victims of discrimination" (p. 122). He is blind to the possibility that 
what he dismisses as the "nasty" but irrelevant details of a "racially 
segmented" work force (p. 122) are the unhappy product of a history 
of racial discrimination that we could and should work to unmake, 
and that the workers on the cannery line are indeed the victims of our 
history. It was a limited vision much like Fried's that drove the five-
Justice majority in Wards Cove to render the industrywide practices 
there virtually invulnerable to attack under Title VII and that, in tum, 
prompted Justice Blackmun, writing in dissent, to wonder "whether 
the majority still believes that race discrimination - or, more accu-
rately, race discrimination against nonwhites - is a problem in our 
society, or even remembers that it ever was."17 
The Reagan approach championed by Fried is not color-blind, at 
least in the sense intended by the elder Justice Harlan; it is history-
blind. No one familiar with even the rough outlines of American his-
tory could deny that profound injustices have been systematically vis-
14. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
15. See 490 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 490 U.S. at 663 n.4 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
16. 490 U.S. at 664 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
17. 490 U.S. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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ited on a variety of racial groups during the modem settlement, 
domestication, and industrialization of our nation; and no one who 
lives in our world and accepts the evidence of his or her senses could 
believe that we have purged ourselves of the consequences of this sorry 
history. Disadvantage, distrust, and distaste have been passed from 
generation to generation, leaving our society sharply and unjustly di-
vided along the fault lines of race. 
For decades, the question how best to proceed in the face of this 
blunt reality has preoccupied many who are committed to change, in-
cluding responsible governmental officials. But if persons have the 
right never to be made worse off by government on account of their 
race than they would have been absent unlawful discrimination, then 
redress for most of the consequences of our history of discrimination is 
barred. History-blindness countenances reparations only for the spe-
cific, identifiable victims of discrimination themselves and at the 
expense of the specific, identifiable beneficiaries; accordingly, govern-
mental entities violate the Constitution if they try to undo any but the 
most proximate, traceable artifacts of their own discrimination. Hav-
ing failed for much of our history to protect against what Fried· him-
self characterizes as public and private apartheid, the Constitution 
now is made vigilant against attempts to undo the consequences of 
that apartheid that reach beyond local and immediate wrongdoing. 
The appeal of the history-blind Constitution is far from self-evi-
dent. The ambition of dismantling the consequences of race discrimi-
nation shares no moral ground with that of maintaining white 
·supremacy in a segregated society: while the latter is despicable and 
unconstitutional, the former is one of the most distinguished ends to-
ward which governmental authority can be directed. Accordingly, 
nothing in the esteemed tradition we associate with Brown v. Board of 
Education 18 can be taken as supportive of history-blindness. That 
view must depend for its justification on a different and problematic 
claim: that persons disfavored on account of their race in the service 
of dismantling the consequences of prior discrimination are thereby 
done an injustice, unless they were themselves direct beneficiaries of 
prior racial discrimination. 
But when government works to achieve legitimate ends, it often 
must establish criteria in furtherance of those ends, criteria that prefer 
some and disfavor others.19 Unless those criteria are independently 
ruled out, we judge their propriety in terms of their connection to the 
ends they serve. A history-blin¢1 view of affirmative action depends on 
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
19. A state academic institution, for example, might favor some applicants because of: (a) 
their geographic origins or intention to locate professionally in poorly serviced areas; (b) their 
demonstrated commitments to work in the public interest as they perceive it; or (c) their sus-
tained development in other endeavors such as musical performance or athletics. 
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the unsupported view that racial criteria are inherently unjust, no mat-
ter what end they serve. 
Fried offers no real defense of this, either as a matter of political 
justice or constitutional law; indeed, as the burden of our discussion 
suggests, it is far from apparent that a defense can be found. And 
remarkably, Fried's commitment to history-blindness, upon which his 
constitutional attack on affirmative action depends, is every bit as un-
stable as is his commitment to legislative authority over the status of 
the fetus, upon which his attack on Roe depends. 
Fried takes pains to distinguish himself from the many other Rea-
gan warriors who took a stricter line with regard to the precepts of 
color-blindness. Fried, for example, argues that communities that 
have discriminatorily awarded municipal construction contracts in the 
past, or that can point to "specific and identifiable" past discrimina-
tion within the local construction industry, can constitutionally favor 
minority-owned construction companies with set-aside requirements 
of the sort at issue in Croson (pp. 127-28). This, of course, contradicts 
the view that it is unconstitutional to disfavor anyone by virtue of their 
race except to the extent that they were personally the beneficiaries of 
past discrimination. That a community itself engaged in past discrimi-
nation, or that a community is addressing "specific and identifiable" 
discrimination by others, does not warrant that only the people 
harmed by past discrimination will be aided now or that only people 
benefited by past discrimination will be harmed now. 
IV 
One is tempted to be tolerant of this muddled moderation. Coher-
ence aside, it seems more savory than rigid adherence to the principles 
of history-blindness and state legislative authority over fetal status; 
neither of these principles, after all, is defensible. In an earlier era, 
there was a joke attributed to Eastern Europe in which communist hell 
was preferred to capitalist hell because of its great inefficiency. In a 
similar vein, a flawed acolyte of modem conservatism may look better 
than a true believer. 
Indeed, there is a reason for being more sympathetic still. A plau-
sible understanding of the gaps in reason within his memoir is that 
Professor Fried, at least in retrospect, is drawn to human values sup-
pressed by the revolutionary manifesto of Reagan conservatism -
that he ultimately refuses to be bound by the logic of a failed moral 
geometry. 
But there are at least three important reasons to emphasize the 
structural flaws in Fried's case. The first, of less global consequence 
than the others, concerns a leitmotif of Brennan-bashing. At a 
number of points, Fried faults Justice Brennan, and always for the 
same delict: surreptitiously advancing his political agenda at the price 
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of clear reason. 20 It is irksome to encounter these repeated and derog-
atory references to a luminary jurist in a work so vulnerable to pre-
cisely the same charge. 
The second reason involves the connection in normative discourse 
between coherence and reason. Fried aims not merely to provide a 
sympathetic account of his experiences as Solicitor General in the 
Reagan administration, but to persuade us of the rectitude of the 
broad premises on which the conservative revolution in constitutional 
law is proceeding. The inconsistency of those premises with each 
other and with plausible social outcomes is ori~ of the strongest rea-
sons for rejecting the premises themselves. 
The third reason is the problem of sugar-coating. By offering a 
version of the conservative constitutional revolution that denies its 
natural reach, Fried softens the political unacceptability of the views 
he sponsors. But he twice asked the Supreme Court to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, not to moderate its trimester-based protection of women suffer-
ing unwanted pregnancies. Had he succeeded, it is far from likely that 
he would have returned to the Court and urged it to recognize those 
qualified rights he now says women should have; and it is less likely 
still that the Court, having accepted his basic position, would have 
been moved to extend rights so obviously inconsistent with that 
position. 
We can only wonder how Fried himself would choose between his 
conservative principles and his more appealing instincts were he a 
judge. 
20. See, e.g., pp. 77, 92-93, 115-16. 
